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V
Vierter Vortrag
Prof. Dilley
Economic Policy and the Monopoly Problem
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:
May I say that I regard your kind invitation to me to deli-
ver one of the lectures at this Convention as a distinct honor?
It is another chapter in my very happy acquaintance with Ger-
man university students and faculty members. I am speaking to
you to-day as one student of the social and economic problems
of our time to other students of those problems. I do not speak
for the United States Government or for the United States Mili¬
tary Government or for any division thereof. I am speaking strictly
as an individual Citizen of the United States and for myself alone.
Recently I had the privilege of giving a series of lectures on
economic problems and policy in the International Summer School
at the University of Marburg. It was one of the happiest and
most enlightening experiences of my life. There I met students
and faculty members from many of your great German univer¬
sities. I was greatly impressed by the quality of the students
with whom I came in contact. In many years of College and uni¬
versity teaching experience I have never met students who as a
group were more intelligent, who demonstrated more initiative
and leadership ability or who were so genuinely eager to seize
every opportunity to learn. In my discussions with the students,
however, I discovered that they had misconceptions as to the
purposes of the United States occupation in its zone of Germany.
I regard an understanding of some of these points as being of
such paramount importance that with your permission I propose
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to comment briefly on some of the more outstanding of those
misconceptions before taking up my prepared lecture.
Comment on ideas encountered at Marburg
I found that many of the students and faculty members whom
I met in Marburg were aware only of the negative aspects of the
program of the Military Government, such as denazification, repa-
rations, demilitarization and decartelization. They had the idea
that there was very little of a positive nature on the program,
that the aims of the occupation were to prevent the social and
economic recovery of Germany. They could see in the level-of-
industry program for example, only a scheme for impoverishing
their country. As a matter of fact, the level-of-industry program
is not in any sense designed to reduce Germany to a pastoral
state. On the contrary, it is my belief that one purpose of
the level-of-industry program is just the opposite. In addition
to eliminating war potential it was designed to make sure that
other programs, such as reparations do not cut too deeply into
the economy of Germany. It was established to make certain that
sufficient industry would be left in Germany to provide the Ger-
man people with a Standard of living equal to the average of the
rest of Europe. The principle is that below or beyond this point
reparations, removals must not go. I found that the positive side
of Military Government activities had not been brought to the
attention of the students, that they knew little of the efforts of
such agencies as the Industry Branch, the Food and Agriculture
Branch, the Export-Import Branch and the Transportation Divi¬
sion to help in restoring the German economy to a tolerable living
Standard.
Those agencies are staffed with the ablest experts in their
various fields who were obtainable in the United States. The acti¬
vities of those agencies are by no means negative. On the contrary
their functions are quite positive. They are bending every effort.
to help revive the shattered German economic life. It must be
remembered that only a little more than a year ago Germany
was still a battle ground. Military Government has to start from
Scratch, these agencies had to be organized and personnel had to
be recruited before even a beginning could be made on the for-
midable task of assisting the revival of the German economic
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System, an economy which had been drained by six years of total
war and battered to a pulp by air raids and invading armies. The
positive accomplishments of Military Government in the United
States zone are by no means negligible.
Time does not permit extensive elaboration of this point but
I will cite just a few of the accomplishments in food and agri-
culture. In July and August 1946, imports of wheat and flour
from the United States and paid for by the American tax-payer,
provided % of the bread ration in the zone. ö1/? million dol-
lars worth of seed, 90 percent of the seed requirements for this
year's crop, was imported from the United States in the last year;
as was binder twine, cotton for sacking grain, calcium arsenic
for spraying potatoes, and nitrogen for fertilizer. The zone pro¬
duced only 950 calories of food per person in 1945—46; all over
that amount was supplied by the United States. Top American
experts in agronomy, nutrition, seeds, dairying, etc., have been
put to work in Germany. The provision to the German people
of food and health items alone is costing the United States tax-
payers about 200.000.000 dollars per year. It is costing the Ameri¬
can people just about one million dollars per month to supply
the German economy only with essential petroleum products.
60.000 bales of American cotton have recently been imported to
supply raw material for the German textile industry. Part of
the textiles made from the cotton will be sold abroad to pay for
the raw cotton. The remainder of the finished textile products
will be used to supply German civilian needs.
And so the record goes. Agencies of United States Military
Government are striving and with considerable success to provide
food and medical supplies, to get the wheels of German industry
turning, to reconstruct the transportation System, to produce
exportable merchandise with which to purchase abroad the criti-
cally needed raw materials required by the German economy, and
to increase the production of German agriculture so that the Ger¬
man economic System may soon be able to support the country
and so that German workers may soon again have work. It is
unrealistic to suppose that we would be following any other course.
The economic welfare of all Europe, not to mention humanitarian
considerations, requires a reasonable reconstruction of peaceful
German industries. Only as that reconstruction is achieved can
the terrific cost of the occupation to the American tax-payer be
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reduced. I deem it of the utmost importance that these matters
be brought to the attention of German students and teachers in
their true light. For it is only with the enlightened assistance and
Cooperation of the German people that our mutual interests can
be served. Only thus can there be achieved a better life for the
people of Germany.
A few days ago a German economist, in talking about the
necessity of reviving German industry, said to me, »Just for one
illustration, take the light bulb Situation. The German people
cannot buy light bulbs. They are needed desperately. But the.
German light bulb industry cannot produce them because you
(the occupying powers) won't let us import wolfram and wolfram
is essential to the manufacture of light bulbs. We Germans cannot
understand such a policy. Even our peaceful industries, which.
could be operating and the products of which we need despera¬
tely, are not allowed to operate.« I replied that he must be mis-
taken, that I knew there was a desperate shortage of light bulbs
and that it was inconceivable to me that we were not doing every-
thing possible to get the industry back into production. I was
sure he must be mistaken. When I got back to Berlin I investi-
gated and found that the bottleneck is not wolfram at all (There
is a three or four year supply on hand) but the machinery and
plant for processing it. About 70% of the pre-war capacity has
been destroyed or removed. The US zone has only 5 % of that
pre-war capacity and only 60 % of the present Output can be used
for light bulbs because 40 % must be used for radio tubes. In spite
of all that, I found that no less than 408.200 electric light bulbs
were produced last month (August) in the United States Zone.
Between April and August 1946 production increased from 327,000
per month to 408,200 and the goal for 1949 calls for the produc¬
tion of 25 million light bulbs in the US Zone. My friend was simply
mistaken; he had simply come upon some mis-information and
accepted it without investigation. I cite this case to suggest that
when a professional economist of high standing can be misled like
that, no one should be surprised that the typical German man in
the street is confused about these things.
As a member of the Dscartelization Branch, I was particularly'
concerned with the impressions of the students as to the aims
and objectives of the decartelization program. They had the idea
that the decartelization program had been devised by American
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monopolists, big financiers and industrialists in the United States
who want to protect their monopolies, and that the Decarteli¬
zation Branch is here to safeguard the interests of these forces;
that its function is so to cripple the productive efficiency of Ger¬
man industry that Germany will never again be able to offer the
American concerns any effective competition in the markets of
the world. They believed that a program designed to eliminate
domestic cartels in Germany and German participation in inter¬
national cartels, and to break up such gigantic concentrations of
economic power as the I. G. Farben combine, must inevitably
disastrously cripple the production of goods and Services in Ger¬
many.
Nothing could be further from the truth. That analysis rests
on a set of false assumptions. The first is that the bigger a com-
bination or enterprise becomes, the more efficient it will be tech-
nologically. That is a false assumption. It overlooks the fact that
in the production of goods and Services there is what we call in
economics the Optimum size firm and that when a firm goes beyond
the optimum size, technological efficiency goes down and not up.
It also overlooks the fact that the deconcentration program
is aimed primarily not at breaking up plants but at an exami-
nation and revision of the corporate structure of business organi-
sations. If one gigantic corporation which now owns 50 efficient
plants is broken up and in its place are substituted 50 medium
sized corporations, each owning one plant, it does not necessarily
follow that the technological efficiency of those 50 plants will be
reduced thereby. That analysis also overlooks the distinction bet¬
ween business efficiency, the fest of which is profitability,
and economic efficiency, the test of which is the availability
to consumers of high quality goods and Services at the lowest
possible prices. After such a dissolution of gigantic corporations
and the Substitution therefore of medium-sized efficient firms,
economic efficiency (as contrasted with business efficiency)
may very well go up instead of down, because thereafter the
German consumer should pay relatively low competitive prices
for the products of industry, rather than high monopoly prices.
The idea that the Decartelization Branch is merely the tool
of big monopolists, financiers and industrialists in the United
States is little short of laughable. But first let me point out that
all big financiers and industrialists are notmbnopolists. The vast
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majority of them obey the anti-monopoly laws of the U.S. As
to the others, it would be very surprising indeed if those who
are bent on establishing monopoly control had any more fondness
for the work of the Decartelization Branch in Germany than those
same interests have for the work of the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice. The function of the Anti¬
trust Division is the protection of honest competitive business
firms from just such monopolists, to investigate and police the
activities of just those interests constantly and to prosecute them
when evidence is found that they have been guilty of the very
sort of business practices which the Decartelization Branch is
designed to eliminate from the German economy. World mono¬
polists must know perfectly well that if in the future, participation
of German firms in international cartels is prevented, then instead
of not having to compete with German industry in the markets
of the world they may be faced as never before with very intense
competition in the world markets from German producers. Here-
tofore, they have often been able very largely to eliminate such
competition by joining with the German producers of their pro¬
ducts in international cartel agreements, the major purpose of
which was to eliminate their having to compete with German
producers.
I found also that some students had the idea that the Decar¬
telization program was designed to prevent socialism in Germany.
Just a word about that. While I cannot speak for the Govern¬
ment of the United States, I do have some ideas as to the aims
and purposes of our government in its occupation of Germany.
It is my belief, speaking as an individual, that the United States
Government has no desire whatever to prevent the socialization
of all or any part of the German economy, if eventually the Ger¬
man people, speaking through a genuinely democratic German
Government, really want to establish that kind of a society. As
to the idea that the only technologically efficient economy for
Germany is one which is largely dominated by such gigantic con-
centrations of economic power as the I. G. Farbenindustrie, an
economy, every phase of which is strictly controlled by a System
of government-sponsored cartels, it is our view that such a notion
is equally fallacious. I shall develop this proposition somewhat
in my prepared lecture, to which I turn now.
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Background of the American attitude
toward Monopoly
For 200 years most of *the peoples of the Western World have
sought ever more and more freedom. On the political side this
quest found its expression in the American revolution, the French
Revolution and other outbreaks by which the tyranny of political
despots was thrown off and governments of the people and by
the people were established.
On the economic side these revolutionary movements were
no less significant. They were revolts against the mercantilist
system which had prevailed for hundreds of years and under which
the political State had imposed the most minute regulation upon
the economic relationships of men. By these revolutions the grip
of the political State on the economic activities of men was broken.
The American Revolution was, in its economic aspects, a revolt
against the whole philosophy of mercantilism. The mercantilist
system collapsed because it had outlived its usefulness and be¬
cause a new politico-economic philosophy, the philosophy of de¬
mocratic laissez-faire capitalism had seized the minds and fired
the imaginations of men nearly everywhere in the Western World.
Following the American Revolution the people of the United
States wrote a new Constitution. After 175 years under the domi¬
nation of the mercantilist government of England our people sought
economic freedom as well as political freedom. Hence that Consti¬
tution was an economic document as well as a political document.
In its economic aspects that Constitution as originally written and
interpreted was nothing less than a charter for democratic laissez-
faire capitalism. The five paramount characteristics of laissez-faire
capitalism are: (1) free private enterprise, (2) free private indivi¬
dual initiative, (3) free competition, (4) free private profit motive,
and (5) free private property. The term »free« as used here means
relative freedom of the individual from interference by the politi¬
cal state.
Theory of democratic free enterprise
Traditionally then, the people of the United States have
believed that if interference by the political state in the economic
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affairs of men was reduced to mere reasonable regulation, and
that if beyond that, all men were left free to exercise their own
individual initiative, accumulate their own private property, invest
their savings in any kind of enterprise they saw fit, in competition
with all other men, and allowed to pocket their own private profits
and take their chances on their own private losses, we would
achieve a better society than any ever yet achieved in which all
such activities were minutely controlled by the sovereign. They
believed that in such a society a maximum of goods would be
produced at the lowest possible cost, prices would be lower, wages
would be higher, inventive genius would be stimulated, economic
progress would be maximized, that the highest possible general
Standard of living would be achieved for all the people, and, most
important of all, that men would enjoy such freedom as mankind
had never known on the planet before in all the ages.
It was a magnificent dream — a noble experiment in human
relationships. And it worked. It worked amazingly well for about
ioo years. Then gradually something went wrong. The founding
fathers who wrote the Constitution had never dreamed of such a
thing asa 5.000.000.000 dollar corporation. They had never foreseen
or even imagined such a thing as a modern railroad Company,
not to mention a present day super-holding Company. And there
was no place in their scheme of things for the super-holding Com¬
pany, the 5.000.000.000 dollar corporation or for corporations even
one tenth that large. But the 500.000.000 dollar corporations,
the super-holding companies and finally the 5.000.000.000 dollar
corporation appeared upon the scene.
The first repercussions were feit in the rumblings of the Granger
Movement (farmers' organizations in the middle-western States)
in the 1870's and 8o's and the attempts of the individual states
to deal with these new monsters. And when these attempts failed
the Federal Government was forced to step into the picture with
the Sherman Interstate Commerce Law of 1887 and three years
later with the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890. We had come
to the end of an era, the era of government non-intervention in
economic affairs. The era of laissez-faire capitalism in the United
States had ended and we had embarked upon a new era of regu-
lated capitalism.
In the United States either we could not or would not prevent
giganticism in industry and finance with its inevitable overtones
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of monopoly abuse. So, following 1890 ,we were dedicated to the
policy of policing it. We would prevent and eliminate combinations
in restraint of trade, collusion, price fixing and other monopolistic
practices by means of antitrust suits.
In international trade the people of the United States have
believed in freedom of the seas and the »open-door« policy, so
that all men of whatever race or creed or nation would be free
tu buy and seil goods in the markets of the world whenever and
wherever they wished, in competition with all other men. And
they have believed in those principles in international relations for
the same reasons as they believed in free competition and free
private enterprise at home.
Beginning of the Cartel economy in Germany
In dealing with the problems of concentrated economic power
and the rise of monopolies, Germany took a very different course
from that followed in the U.S. The cartel movement took firm
root in Germany following the financial crisis of 1873, when the
clamor for a „stabilized price level" on the part of the big indu¬
strialists became a din. A cartel may be defined as a contractual
association of legally independent enterprises in the same field or
related fields of business activity, formed for the purpose of in-
fluencing the market by means of regulating competition; it is
virtually always some sort of combination in restraint of trade.
The German law favored rather than hampered combinations in
restraint of trade and the German business mentality was accu-
stomed to discipline and Subordination. The adoption of high pro-
tective tariff duties in 1879 completed the picture, for it gave
the cartels the final tool for regulating domestic prices. Germany
had become a confirmed cartel country. A cartel state of mind
had replaced a free enterprise mentality1).
Theory of the Cartel Economy
It would be easy to write off the theory of a cartelized economy
from the individual's viewpoint by simply calling it the product
l) Temporary National Economic Committee, Ü. S. Senate Committee Mono-
graph No. 40, Regulation of Economic Activities in Foreign
Countries, Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941, p. 36.
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of naked greed, and lust for power on the part of industrial giants.
But the answer is not so simple as that. There is a considerable
body of intelligent opinion which holds that unrestrained com¬
petition is not intrinsically good, that modern industrial society
has reached such an ädvance and complicated stage that consi-
derable stability in prices and markets is required if periodic dis-
ruption and chaos is to be averted. It is believed that the grave
evils of bankruptey, liquidation, unemployment and suffering will
result unless such stability is achieved.
From the standpoint of society it is argued by some people
that free enterprise capitalism has outlived its usefulness, that the
state, by fostering cartels or otherwise, must stabilize economic
life by control of foreign exchanges, imports and exports, com-
modity prices, wages, interest, rents, profits and hours of work.
This philosophy has been called »Twentieth Century mercantilism«
and it is in direct conflict with the traditional American ideal of
free private enterprise.
Development between the wars
Someone has observed that the emergence of Germany in the
1930's as a menace to world peace with such terrifying speed was
attributable to three »C's« — coal, chemists and cartels. As a
result of the Versailles Treaty, German industry was forced to
rely increasingly upon different and more costly raw materials.
To a great extent it became an industry of synthetics. Other
nations controlled nitrate of soda, oil deposits, natural rubber;
so the German chemists made synthetic nitrate of soda, synthetic
oil from coal and synthetic rubber from oil. Germany became
the world's largest exporter of chemicals, dyes, drugs, fertilizers
and Photographie materials. German synthetics, such as synthetic
gasoline, synthetic resin, synthetic leather and artificial silk,
appeared on the market.
The »rationalization movement«, the use of scientific, tech-
nical, and organizational methods to increase production, swept
every phase of German industrial and business life, immediately
after the first World War. As a result German industry became
the most completely integrated, from raw material to finished
product, in the world. Methods and products were standardized,
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and the productivity of both labor and capital was vastly increased
by improved methods of production.
Very early after the First World War, as a phase of »ratio-
nalization«, gigantic trusts were formed. Such excessive concen-
tration of economic power is well illustrated by the case of Hugo
Stinnes.who formed the enormous Siemens-Rhein-Elbe-Schuckert-
Union. At the tinie of his death in 1924, Stinnes is reported to
have had an interest in some 1400 business enterprises and to
have controlled about one fifth of Germany's total industrial
production. Among his holdings, to name only a few, were forests,
hoteis, lands, oil fields, paper mills, newspapers, summer resorts,
banks, coal mines, electrical establishments, iron mines, aluminium
works, copper mines etc.1).
Under German laws, contracts among producers to fix prices,
limit. Output, apportion territories or pool profits were legal and
binding and no firm could withdraw from such an agreement
without permission of the Cartel Court. It is not surprising that
in such a climate, cartelization of German industry went forward
by leaps and bounds in the decade of the twenties. The inter¬
national cartel movement kept pace. Largely under the leadership
of the German industrialists a substantial part of the trade of
the world came to be controlled by international cartels. By 1939,
the U.S. Department of Justice listed 179 such agreements, 109
of which were participated in by American firms. The Department
had started proceedings against 37 of them dealing in aircraft
accessories and instruments, military optical instruments, chemi-
cals (including synthetic rubber, plastics, dyestuffs, nitrates, and
explosives), pharmaceuticals, Photographie materials, light bulbs,
fluorescent lighting equipment, magnesium, molybdenum, tita-
nium, and tungsten carbide.
.
The most publicized of the international cartels have been
those concerning foodstuffs, such as coffee, sugar, tea and meat.
In raw materials and semi-finished goods, there are cartels for
pulp, petroleum, rubber, scrap-iron, fertilizers, steel, tin, copper
beryllium, magnesium, aluminium, and probably many others.
A few of the cartelized manufactured products have been paper,
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, dyestuffs, explosives, plastics, electri¬
cal machinery and surgical instruments.
J) Walter C. Langsom, The World since 1914, New York, The Mac-
millan Company, 4th ed., 1936, p. 476.
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One of the most common types of international cartels is
the agreement as to patents and processes. In a study of a sample
of 333 such contracts, it was found that 38 percent of the con-
tracts contained restrictions or prohibitions of exports from the
United States and 43 percent contained restrictions of the fields
of use. In about half of the agreements there were provisions for
cross-licensing and cross-assignments of future patents. Frequently
they stated specifically that the division of territory was to be
continued by future patent agreements. About 75 percent of the
contracts studied provided for division of markets.
Economic effects of cartels
Whether a division of markets along national boundaries by
the use of patent agreements is legal or illegal under the laws of
the United States is beside the point, that such a division of
markets effectively reduces competition andpromotes the mono-
polistic position of the producers in the reserved areas is beyond
question.
The anti-social character of cartels from the economic point
of view is self-evident from their very definition. By definition
they are agreements designed to reduce competition by one or
more of several devices. Such reduction of competition ordinarily
means higher prices, reduced consumption, and less employment
for workers. Although the apologists for cartels usually talk in
terms of »preventing cut-throat competition« or »stabilization of
fair prices« the truth of the matter is that cartel agreements are
formed for the purpose of establishing higher prices than would
prevail under conditions of likely competition in the industry. It
is an economic truism that consumption will ordinarily be lower
if prices are higher. However, it is not only the consumers who
suffer. Lower consumption implies lower production, which in turn
means lower employment. Thus the unemployed workers join the
exploited consumers as victims of the cartel system.
Not only is employment opportunity reduced in the cartelized
industry but, at times, it is reduced in other industries as well.
Since cartel agreements frequently prevent expansion of plant
capacity and the entry of new-comers in the industry, investment
and employment opportunity in the building construction, capital
equipment, and service industries may be curtailed. When cartels
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maintain fixed quotas for the exportation of the product there is
obviously little inducement to expand facilities to increase pro¬
duction for export. The result again is reduced investment, re¬
duced employment and lower national income. International car¬
tels also constitute an artificial barrier to international* trade and
thus help deprive the people of the world of the advantages and
economies of international division of labor.
In defense of the cartel system it is often observed that cartel
members, being protected from the rigors of competition, are free
to conduct expensive research experimentation. Thus it is alleged,
economic progress is advanced and new and improved techniques
of production are developed and applied. There is considerable
evidence to show that just the opposite is more often the result
of cartel activity. Since when did a monopolist have to be effi¬
cient or up to date? One of a great number of vigorous com-
petitors must either be a reasonably efficient producer or perish.
The story of the »burial« of new techniques and processes is a
familiär one to all students of these problems. Unless there is com¬
petition in the industry, a new process which will render obsolete
millions of dollars worth of equipment is not likely to be intro-
duced promptly and perhaps not for many years.
It is often contended that there are good cartels and bad
cartels and that all cartels should not be condemned because of
the transgressions of the few. But cartels by definition are desig¬
ned to restrict production. Is restriction of production ever defen-
sible from the social point of view ? To defend restrictions of pro¬
duction it would be necessary to prove that it is beneficial not
only to the individual producers involved but that it is also advan-
tageous for the economy of the country as a whole. Since such
proof is all but impossible, the good cartel argument breaks down
upon examination.
The criterion of a good cartel is said to be that it stabilizes
prices in the industry at a point no higher than the average of
the fluctuating prices which would have existed had no cartel been
operating. Somehow »price stabilization« has a reassuring sound.
The literature on cartels abounds with the phrase. On the other
hand »price rigidity« or »inflexibility of prices«, which mean the
same thing, sound bad and we rarely see them used. But any such
test lacks validity because it is not susceptible of proof. No one
knows what the average of fluctuating prices would have been
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over a period during which the price did not in fact fluctuate.
The best evidence tends to indicate one thing, however, and that
is that »stabilized prices« usually err on the side of safety; they
usually turn out to be relatively high prices.
This whole assumption of the desirability of stable prices is
suspect. Politicians, lawyers, business men, industrial engineers,
and occasionally some misguided economists, who advocate desi¬
rability of cartel activity to avert »ruinous price conipetition« or
to prevent »selling below cost«, appear to assume that a corpo¬
ration has some sort of »right« to a price which covers its füll
cost of production at all times and in all places and under all
circumstances. The proposition is fallacious. Such a price in an
over-expanded industry would have to be high enough to permit
replacement of the excess plant capacity. On its face such a price
is too high, by definition, from the economic point of view.
The advocates of stabilized prices would have to prove that it
is good for the economy of the country as a whole to have some
prices stabilized while others cannot be. The contrary is the truth.
Stable prices in one part of the economy only amplify price fluc-
tuations in the part where prices are flexible. The result is that
during the depression phase of the business cycle there is unneces-
sarily violent price fluctuation and disaster for the competitive
side of the economy with injury to the society as a whole. Further-
more, stability of prices can only be had at the cost of instability
of production and thus of employment. During prosperity in an
industry in which prices are »stabilized«, production soars; during.
depression it is drastically curtailed, plants close down and wor¬
kers are unemployed. The economic bürden of the depression is
thus shifted from the backs of the business men and corporation
stockholders, who pocket the profits and are therefore supposed
to assume the risk of business, to the consumers in the form of
high prices, to workers in the form of unemployment and to tax-
payers who must foot the relief bills. Such price stabilization
mitigates the cost of cyclical fluctuations for the few at the expense
of the many.
Sometimes it is urged that temporary cartel agreements are
socially desirable in the case of badly mal-adjusted, over-expan¬
ded industries. Such arrangements, it is said, will give the industry
time to bring about »orderly adjustment« of its production capa¬
city and avert a period of »ruinous cut-throat price competition.«
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In the first place, no case has ever been brought to light in which
a cartel agreement was used to achieve that purpose and then
promptly abandoned. Secondly, even in cases where cartels have
been used to bring about some »rationalization« by closing down
»inefficient« plants and turning the production over to the more
efficient plants, the public has had to pay the bill. The owners
of the withdrawn capacity were reimbursed by premiums or bo-
nuses. These in turn were paid for, of course, by consumers in
the form of artificially enhanced prices for the products, by wor¬
kers in the form of unemployment caused by the reduced con¬
sumption of goods, and by the taxpayers.
But even such technical »rationalization« is not common. Just
the opposite frequently happens. The result is often »irrationali-
zation«. By virtue of the cartel agreement the inefficient produ¬
cers can remain in Operation while the really low-cost producers
are forced to curtail production. Instead of the mal-adjustment
being corrected it may be aggravated. Because of the production
quotas governed by the cartel, there is a tendency at times for
the members to expand production facilities in anticipation of the
next bargaining over quotas, thus increasing still more the excess
production capacity in the industry. They know that the greater
their standing by capacity the better are their chances for getting
a higher quota. So instead of »orderly readjustment«, the result
at times may be increased mal-adjustment and still more »justifi-
cation« for the continuation of artificial restrictions on production
to avert »ruinous price competition.«
The »mal-adjusted« industry argument for »temporary« cartels
is reminiscent of the »infant industry« argument for »temporary«
protective tariffs and has even less validity. The »infant« indu¬
stries never seem to reach adulthood. When the old argument for
continuation of tariff protection is worn thread-bare, new ones are
put forward and the tariffs remain. Somehow the »mal-adjusted«
industry never seems to achieve that »orderly adjustment« which
is to be accompanied by the dissolution of the cartel arrangements
and the cartels remain with us.
Today it is fashionable to argue that all is well if only cartels
are »government regulated and supervised«. The following quo-
tation, however, summarizes the views of one prominent student
of these problems. »Government-supervised cartels are a greater
threat to a democratic, competitive society than uncontrolled car-
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tels. An uncontrolled cartel is perpetually exposed to the econo¬
mic thrusts of seceders, Outsiders, and newcomers, and to the
political thrusts of a suspicious public and a critical government.
Government control, on the other hand, is apt to protect the car¬
tel against attacks. Government control is apt to make the cartel
more bureaucratic in its Operations and more autocratic in its
relations with minority groups and customers. Government con¬
trol sanctifies the cartel. Conspiracy becomes »regulation«, unlaw-
ful restraint becomes government-approved »order«, restriction
becomes »planning«. If a choice must be made between govern¬
ment-supervised cartels and »free« cartels, the latter are to be
preferred for the precariousness of their structure and for the
economical and political insecurity of their existence. But there
are, in fact, three possibilities: government-controlled cartels, un¬
controlled cartels, and no cartels at all«1). It is the view of the
vast majority of American economists that the best Solution is
no cartels at all.
The efficiency and productivity
of democratic free enterprise
In closing let me repeat that we reject as wholly without
validity the assumption that the only technologically efficient
economy possible in Germany is one characterized by gigantic
monopolistic concentrations of economic power such as I. G. Far¬
ben and »controlled« by a network of government sanctioned cartel
agreements. We sincerely believe not only in the desirability but
in the efficiency of a democratic free-enterprise society. We have
seen what it can do in the United States and we believe that it
might have done still better had it been even more democratic
and had there been fewer restrictions on free private enterprise..
It was a democratic, free private enterprise philosophy that
built and established the economic system of the United States,
not a cartel philosophy or a socialist philosophy or any other sort
of collectivist philosophy. Has any other economic system ever
provided the people of a country as a whole with such a high
Standard of living or with so much freedom? What eise should
») Fritz Machlup, A Cartel Policy for The United Nations
(Corwin W.Edwards,ed.) New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 23—24.
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an economic system do ? We contend that when it has done that,
it has performed well the functions of an economic system. Do
you know any society in which men have surrendered their econo¬
mic freedom and succeeded in retaining their personal and poli¬
tical freedom? We do not, and until we do believe the people
of our country will elect to keep all of their freedom.
No society on earth ever approached the miracle of production
achieved by that of the United States in the past five years. It
supplied our armed forces and to a considerable extent those of
our Allies. It had a very great deal to do with winning the war.
It produced the atomic bomb. Somehow we managed pretty well
without an economic system tied hand and foot by cartel agree¬
ments.
The only production figures, of the type I was seeking to be
found in our library happen to be on the United States Navy.
I am presenting them only to give you some idea of the magni-
tude of that miracle of production (achieved without a cartel
system). On July 1, 1940 the Congress of the.United States autho-
rized the building of a two-ocean Navy and on that date our Navy
possessed 4,500 vessels of all types. On Juli 1, 1945, just five
years later our Navy had 91,209 vessels of all types, not counting
ships lost in the sneak Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (while
we were at peace, by the way) or later sinkings. We had actually
built 110.000 vessels. During those five years we built 1,265 major
combat ships including ten battle ships, 27 large aircraft carriers,
110 escort aircraft carriers and 45 cruisers. Installed fire power
had been increased from 411 tons of projectiles per 15 seconds
to 4,500 tons per 15 seconds. On that date 11,000 of our Navy
planes were deployed in the Pacific. The United States Navy
roamed the seas of the world wherever it chose and outfought
everything that came within ränge. The great distances of the
Pacific had been overcome by the use of gigantic floating dry-
docks and supply depots which repaired, refueled and replenished-
whole fleets with hardly an interruption of Operations against the
enemy. That represents a production achievement without parallel
in history. During the same period we furnished our Allies with
42 billion dollars worth of lend-lease supplies and equipment and
built an army, an air force and an atomic bomb.
But, you say, »Did you accomplish all that with free private
enterprise, or did you not in fact set aside your free private enter-
9*
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prise system and turn to a system of state capitalism in which
everything was controlled by your government?« The answer is,
yes, we did temporarily set aside free private enterprise, and for
the duration of the emergencywe turned to a system of government
control. That is because time was of the essence and because the
goals of our society were changed over-night. When your house
is on fire you smash Windows and flood the premises with water,
not because that makes a better house but only in order to fight
a still greater evil, where time is of the essence. You know per-
fectly well that smashing Windows and flooding the place with
water did not build the house in the first place and that it is now
only a necessary evil required to meet a temporary emergency.
Likewise we know that it was not a government controlled eco¬
nomy that built the industrial, social and political structure that
made possible our great war effort. It was 150 years of demo¬
cratic, free enterprise philosophy which established the basic indu¬
stries, the transportation, the power, the technical knowledge,
the mechanical skill, the research institutions, the resource-
fulness, the daring, and the managerial genius which stood ready
for instant use when our country was suddenly confronted with
a life-or-death struggle.
But perhaps of equal importance is the fact that overnight,
within 24 hours on December 7, 1941 the goals of our society
changed completely. Very suddenly one set of goals was aban-
doned and another very different set took its place. On and be¬
fore December 7, 1941, the goal of our economic system was the
peaceful one of promoting human welfare, the goal of producing
a high output of goods and Services, and their wide distribution
to our population of 140 million people at the lowest possible
prices while at the same time allowing our people maximum free¬
dom of choice and action and a decent amount of rest and leisure.
Overnight, those goals went out of the window and on Decem¬
ber 8, 1941, the goal of our economic system was no longer human
welfare; it had suddenly become the prosecution or total war.
Our objective was to crush German Nazism and Japanese Im-
perialism, so thoroughly that neither would ever again be able
to loose a reign of murder and terror upon its neighbors Or for
that matter upon its own people. Virtually all considerations of
good food, good clothes, good housing, rest, entertainment, cul¬
tural expression, recreation, leisure and most important of all for
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our purposes here today, considerations of economical production,
took a secondary place.
Considerations of efficiency, considerations of economy in
production and distribution of goods were suddenly of little im¬
portance. We turned immediately from the economically efficient
processes of democratic free private enterprise to the relatively
less economically efficientsystem of rigid government control and
regulation of virtually the entire economy. Suppose for example
that a gigantic propeller on an aircraft carrier had been shot away
in the Pacific and a replacement was desperately needed at the
earliest possible moment, and that it was found that a plant at
Youngstown, Ohio, could make and deliver it 30 days quicker than
any other. Nobody asked or cared how much it would cost; nobody
lost any sleep over the fact that it was really economically un-
sound to produce such an item in Ohio; no one wasted any time
demonstrating that efficiency in production required that the pro¬
peller be manufactured in Pittsburgh, Pa. The only thing that mat¬
tered was the fact that the Youngstown plant could get it to the
ship 39 days sooner than any other.
Our people tolerated such regimentation and restraint and
economic inefficiency only because of the war emergency. Imme¬
diately after the end of the war with Japan we began the painful
process of de-controlling. The people of the U. S. were so sick of
such a system that the clamor for removal of controls reached
a dangerous pitch. Our people wanted their freedom and efficiency
back with all possible speed. And there was serious danger that
certain controls, such as price control for example, might be remo-
ved too soon.
Now, in closing, let me suggest that the outlook is not all
black for the people of Germany. We are convinced that you
can have a highly efficient system of competitive free private
enterprise which will surpass in economy of production and parti-
cularly in economic efficiency any system characterized by
gigantic monopolies and bound hand and foot by the shackles of
cartels. I have observed that economic Systems have amazing
recuperative powers, that they recover with astonishing speed from
disasters such as floods, earth quakes, tidal waves and wars. While
I am not a prophet, I will venture to predict that within five
years you will not be able to recognize the German economy as
having any similarity to the one you see here today that
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your society will again be producing enormous quantities of pea-
cetime consumer goods and Services, that the Standard of living
of the German people will be much closer to normal, and that
you will know a reasonably good life in Germany.
Prof. Dr. von Wiese dankt dem Redner gleichfalls in eng¬
lischer Sprache und versichert ihm, daß die Zuhörer seine Aus¬
führungen in guter Erinnerung behalten werden.
